Many of you will have seen this set of photographs of the region surrounding Chernobyl in Ukraine, some from archives and others taken by an unnamed Ukrainian woman who motorcycles through the area. (Since the combination of an attractive woman, a powerful motorcycle and an apocalyptic landscape constitutes some kind of pathetic geek fantasy, the original site was swiftly slashdotted; the above link is to a mirror I've made.)
Some time ago I pondered the question of `nuclear terrorism', and particularly the risk of an attack on a nuclear power station using a hijacked aeroplane. It remains unclear to me whether this is a realistic attack, but I think there's some chance that the containment structure of a reactor could be severely enough damaged by a crashing aeroplane to vent the reactor to the atmosphere. (The Chernobyl accident ocurred when an explosion inside the reactor vented its contents to the atmosphere.)
How much of a mess would this make?
The answer -- as if you didn't know it -- is `a bloody big mess'. Here's a map of the southeastern UK, with the exclusion zones around Chernobyl overlaid on the area around the Sizewell power station:
(This is an approximate and pessimistic scenario. Obviously the fallout might be blown east, out to sea, rather than onto the land. After the Chernobyl accident, the wind changed while the fallout plume was still in the air, and the fallout settled both to the northeast and southwest of the reactor. In the above map, I've assumed an offshore wind which does not change direction while the fallout settles. I picked Sizewell because it's local. The data come from this site on Chernobyl, but unfortunately I've had to composite the above map manually because that site doesn't provide raw data on radiological contamination. The exclusion and evacuation zones are related to particular levels of contamination, chiefly with caesium-137, which is the major contaminant over a scale of a few years -- its halflife is about thirty years. The immediate radiological hazard would have been iodine-131, with a one-week halflife. The underlying map image is produced from the Ordnance Survey Get-a-map service. Image reproduced with kind permission of Ordnance Survey and Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland.)
As I said above, I'm not sure whether a nuclear power station containment dome could be seriously damaged by an airliner crash. In 1988, Sandia National Laboratories in the US performed a test to address this question, by taking the fuselage of an old F4 fighter aeroplane and driving it into a concrete slab at 480 mph using a bunch of rockets. After the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, they published footage from the test on their website. The results of this test suggested that such a slab would be penetrated to a depth of about 2cm by the aeroplane fuselage, or about 6cm by the engines (which have very heavy axles, by comparison to the rest of the aeroplane). There are more details in this FAQ response; basically, the body of the aeroplane does very little damage (2cm penetration) but the engines go a bit further (6cm). Commercial aeroplanes are much heavier and have larger engines, of course. In my view the risk can't be ruled out, and effective countermeasures -- siting anti-aircraft missiles at nuclear sites -- are sufficiently cheap to be worthwhile in any case.

Comments
Posted by Tom Steinberg, Wednesday, 10 March 2004 23:34 (link):
Cor - what a mess.
Posted by Tom Steinberg, Wednesday, 10 March 2004 23:38 (link):
I've also noticed that in the video the camera operator overshoots the block, a bit like the way the camera in a football game often heads where the ball looks like it is going to go before it is deflected. However, in this case it seems a bit less forgivable. Did the operator really think it was going to get very far past the enormous concrete lump?
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Thursday, 11 March 2004 00:40 (link):
You mean the one which tracks the fuselage as it goes along the track? (This one.)
That video must be slowed down by quite a large factor. I suspect that the cameraman had enough trouble tracking the sled at all, let alone stopping the pan as soon as the thing hit the concrete slab. (An F4 is about 20m long; at impact, the thing was going at 215m/s, so should take about a tenth of a second to travel its own length. But on the film it takes, I dunno, a second or so, so there's a factor of ten in there.)
Posted by Maria Farrell, Thursday, 11 March 2004 09:49 (link):
All very scary. As an Irish person, I can't help also thinking how many more of the U.K.'s nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are located away from the south east of England and on the west coasts of Wales and Scotland - in some places only 40 miles from the heavily populated east coast of Ireland. Admittedly, these stations are not the juiciest of terrorist targets compared to a plant near London, but their security has an enormous potential impact on Ireland. We all share the risk, but only the U.K. can mitigate it in this case.
Posted by Chris Lightfoot, Thursday, 11 March 2004 10:39 (link):
Sellafield is the biggest problem; there's a huge inventory of waste in storage there, and it's not nearly as well shielded as the power stations are. The prevailing wind across the UK is westerly, which may be a little consolation, but not much.
Locations: there are six stations on the south and east coast of England; two on the east coast of Scotland; two on the west coast of Scotland; and five on the west coast of England, including two on the Bristol Channel, plus Sellafield. (The Electricity Association has a map of the UK power grid, which may be of interest.) Some of those are Magnox stations which are shortly to be shut down; although the stations awaiting decommissioning still contain lots of unpleasant radioisotopes, they are less attractive terrorist targets, because they will contain very little iodine-131, which is the most biologically hazardous contaminant in the short term.
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